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LESSONS OF EVERYDAYLAWILE DROITDU QUOTIDIEN BY
RODERICK A. MACDONALD (MONTREAL & KINGSTON:
MCGILL-QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2002) 139 pages.
BY ROSANNA LANGER'
Rod Macdonald's interpretative anecdotes were originally posted
as individual "President's Messages" on the Law Commission of Canada
website during Macdonald's tenure there between May 1998 and February
2000. The compilation of these anecdotes is a wonderfully accessible
introduction to the consideration of law's social aspects and potential. The
author states several central jurisprudential premises with disarming
simplicity, including that rules may determine how we conceive of an issue,
that justice is as much process as outcome, and that forms of inquiry
determine the structure of legal decision making.
Each story is prefaced by a brief discussion of the legal issues raised
by the anecdote and their relevance to the project of law reform. Each
section is concluded with partially annotated and engagingly opinionated
suggestions, both academic and non-academic, for further contemplation,
including reflections of popular culture such as movies, television programs,
and children's literature. The collection will be of interest to legal
educators, law and society scholars, and a popular audience of lay students
of the law. It is also an entirely Canadian text: published by Queen's
University School of Policy Studies, it is a double-headed volume, one side
English, one sidefrancais.
The relationship between law and society is the central problematic
of much scholarship, often with the underlying desire to use empirical
knowledge for state and institutional ends, policy development, and legal
reform. These short essays place Macdonald, alongside his intellectual
mentor Lon Fuller, firmly in the camp of those who assert that law emerges
from social relationships. To correct the dominant view that law is primarily
prohibitive, we must also assert law's facilitative dimension. Our
interactions with others, he contends, give us the opportunity to form
expectations and develop self-constraint, and provide the context for our
individual and collective aspirations. Law is not only a set of imposed rules,
but it is also the outcome of social interactions. In this view, law arises out
of social relations; it is not imposed on them. The implicit assumption is
that law is embedded in social relations.
Assistant Professor of Law and Justice, Laurentian University.
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As a lawyer, I often worry about nomocentricity-the inclination to
see law everywhere. Is all interaction legal? This would be an
impoverishment of ordinary existence if it were so. Macdonald addresses
this concern. To characterize social interactions through a legal lens is a
choice made when we choose to evaluate social encounters in terms of
rules, fairness, interpretation, and authority.' But Macdonald does make
distinctions between informal everyday law and official law. Everyday law
is implicit, not consciously generated. Precisely because it is not codified,
everyday law requires us to generate explicit substantive reasons in
individual instances. And finally, everyday law claims its authority from
"experience, wisdom and good judgement"3 rather than from power and
expertise. Macdonald cautions that formalizing these everyday laws
governing ordinary social relations such as those among neighbours,
friends, and relatives may undermine rather than facilitate these relations.
Sometimes it is better to leave them inchoate. Furthermore, despite all
good intentions, we cannot predict how laws will be used, and in being
applied, how they will be shaped by the establishment of precedent and the
development of a body of interpretation.
Macdonald questions the premises underpinning legal burdens of
proof: he asks how we can rely on legal concepts designed to draw
inferences from that which we observe directly when these inferences may
be wrong. In addition, when does legal decision making succeed in
incorporating the unfamiliar into a pre-existing category and when do we
reach the limits of the applicability of old concepts? I have posed similar
questions myself, both in undergraduate law and society courses and legal
theory seminars. They arise from the foundations underlying legal systems.
Macdonald usefully introduces them here. Their resolution is important not
only for the nature of legal reasoning generally, but also for law reform.
Themes concerning identity are also highly topical: only recently did
legal theory focus on the question of which aspect of our own identities we
might choose to highlight in legal representation (for example, with respect
to equality considerations) and on the extent of that choice. In light of the
enormous recent global incursions into privacy and identity, the newer
question, no less relevant, has shifted to which aspects of identity the state
can legitimately identify us by. Macdonald frames the paradox of multiple
identities differently than I have done through his focus on community
associations and informalism in institutions. Nonetheless, his focus raises
equally interesting questions about the potential and limits of formal
2 Macdonald, supra note 1 at 5-8.
Ibid. at 7.
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recognition of group identities.
Although we must acknowledge the distinctions between informal
regulation of everyday interpersonal practices and formal regulatory
structures and legal regimes, Macdonald's stories are really allegories about
intimate connections between them. The tales are grouped under four
themes. In the first grouping are stories that highlight the values and
functions of rules and rule making in creating a social order. What rules will
achieve distributive justice? What are the consequences of overreaching
rules or rules that are implemented without sufficient consultation? Must
laws command or should they merely provide us with guidelines elaborating
on the duties we know we have?
The second group examines the limits of rules and the problem of
reforming rules that are outdated, inefficient, or apply to circumstances
that no longer exist. How far can we stretch old rules to accommodate new
realities? What considerations affect when to reform and when to begin
anew? What happens when the fit between law and social issue has become
awkward, but is not yet ripe for law reform?
Decision making is the subject matter of the third group, unifying
inquiries into what type of argument is a sound one, what principles govern
the balance between the letter and the spirit of the rule, and the choice
between differing types of inquiry. What is the relationship between rules
and rationales for rules? What happens when the rules are out of step with
our expectations of them? How may we distinguish when we need new rules
for unusual circumstances or when it is sufficient to refer to underlying
principles? How do we distinguish between situations that require
interrogative or adjudicative processes?
The final group loosely investigates the role of identity in law: the
choices we must make about categorizing events from a certain perspective,
accounting for multiple identities and multiple group associations in law.
How does the categorization of issues affect how we think about them and
what we want to do about them? What should the relationship be between
informal and community institutions and state policies? How do we
reconcile informal and formal bases of institutional power?
It is worth mentioning that Macdonald frames these questions as
open-ended. As befits his recent role as President of the Law Commission
of Canada, he is intensely interested in the choice among competing
alternatives, reasons for making the choices that we do, and both the
underlying values and the consequences flowing from these choices. Law
is both an embodiment of social relations and an instrumental device for
achieving social order. Thus, while Macdonald's stories tell us about how
social facts are organized for legal purposes, they also raise issues about
how social relations are influenced and characterized by administrative and
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institutional imperatives. We must also consider the manner in which legal
discourse imposes its imprimatur on meaning, thereby ensuring that the
influences of legalism and dominant interests on meaning are often
decisive. While intersubjectivity may lie at the heart of legal practices, the
exercise of power, primarily economic, regulatory, and political, often
determines outcomes. Macdonald's story "Street Hockey, Skateboarding
and Responsive Law" raises this theme for consideration. It notes that
teenagers and their families are not only a legitimate neighbourhood
constituency, but that failure to accommodate their need for harmless local
pursuits may displace them to less desirable locales, potentially creating the
problem of delinquency.
Although Macdonald's text has much to say about rules, under their
colourful and sometimes folksy exteriors, several of the stories explore
repetitively similar considerations. This risks redundancy on the themes of
legislative intention, scope, and method. Although the essays are engaging
because of their storytelling tone, the discussion does not always proceed
into the considerations one might expect at the outset. For example, the
discussion about the unique nature of legal inquiry and decision making in
"I Was Rolling on the Floor and It Fell In" hints at decision-making
frameworks other than criminal prosecution but does not identify or explain
those frameworks as promised. Instead, the discussion focuses on the role
of victim witnesses and how difficult it may be for them to revisit their
experience, especially in a cross-examination. A lay reader would be left
with an impression that these other forms, such as inquiries, inquests, or
administrative tribunals, are less common or less important than a criminal
trial. The last part of the story neutralizes the potential of the first part.
Furthermore, given the distorted privileging of criminal prosecution in the
media, a public legal agency with the educational mandate of the Law
Commission of Canada would be an obvious forum to correct this view.
In some cases, legal developments are squeezed into the mould of
Macdonald's preoccupation with law reform at the expense of an accurate
representation of the events. For example, in an essay titled, "Sometimes
It's Better Just to Fix the Dock," he refers to the ultimate defeat of criminal
regulation of therapeutic abortions as a kind of organic atrophy rather than
the protracted activist struggle that it was, and remains, against repeated
attempts to prosecute and even to reintroduce both federal and provincial
legislation.
Is all law merely rules? Macdonald's commitment to law as a
constitutive dimension of social relations surely includes acceptance of law
as a social phenomenon. Yet these essays say too little about legal
consciousness; law and other forms of social ordering; law and culture; legal
actors; and law in its ideological aspects, such as the problem of legitimacy.
2004]
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The few tantalizing references left me wishing for more extensive
discussions on informal dispute resolution, the problems of discretionary
decision making, and the function of law in mediating between individuals
and institutions. Macdonald is a master at articulating the underlying
structure and issues at stake in legal policy discussions.4 It is a fine thing
that he turned his expertise to making these discussions more broadly
accessible, but I find his tales too modest indeed as they stop short of telling
us what is at stake.
However, it is too easy a critique to point at what is missing from a
well-intentioned effort. The genius of this collection is in its simple
illustration of how legal meaning may be accomplished from social facts.
Macdonald's anecdotes provide not only precious springboards to illustrate
legal concepts, but also illustrate, with authoritative ease, the relative
seamlessness between law and ordinary life.
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWBY ROBERT C. POST WITH K.
ANTHONY APPIAH, JUDITH BUTLER, THOMAS C. GREY &




[A] sign on a courthouse door proclaiming "Men Only" evokes an entire history of
discrimination against a historically disadvantaged class; a sign on a barroom door that reads
"No Minors" fails to similarly offend.
Gosselin v. Quebec (A.G.)3
4 As a mere representation of Macdonald's extensive oeuvre, see R.A. Macdonald, "A Theory of
Procedural Fairness" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 3; Roderick A. Macdonald, "Understanding
Regulation by Regulations" in Ivan Bernier & Andr~e Lajoie, eds., Regulations, Crown Corporations and
Administrative Tribunals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 89; Roderick A. Macdonald,
"Access to Justice and Law Reform" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 287; Ontario Law Reform
Commission, Study Paper on Prospects for Civil Justice (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission,
1995) (Roderick A. Macdonald) (an initiative of the Ontario Civil Justice Review entailing a
fundamental reconsideration of civil disputing in Ontario). Between 1989-1991, Macdonald chaired a
Task Force on Access to Civil Justice in Quebec.
I [Prejudicial Appearances].
2 Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. This review benefitted from the excellent
research assistance of Pinta Maguire and the advice of my colleagues Bruce Ryder and Kate Sutherland.
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 at 469 [Gosselin].
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